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61. Introduction
This workshop was organized and hosted by the Constitution-Building Processes 
Programme of the International Institution for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(International IDEA), the Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law and the Global 
Justice Academy, in association with the Political Settlements Research Programme at 
the University of Edinburgh. It explored the first stage of the transition from violence 
to politics, which potentially includes a sequence of political agreements from a peace 
deal to a (new) constitutional arrangement. 
This was the second event in a series of annual workshops known as the Edinburgh 
Dialogues on Post-Conflict Constitution-Building. The inaugural workshop on ‘Interim 
Constitutions in Post-Conflict Settings’ addressed the role of interim constitutions as 
peacebuilding and democracy-building tools, and considered those who negotiate and 
draft these constitutions and how these documents differ from peace agreements and 
final constitutions (Davies et al. 2015). International IDEA presented the findings of 
the inaugural workshop in a Policy Paper (Zulueta-Fülscher 2015). 
The second workshop built on comparative knowledge and understanding of the 
constitution-building process as part of the broader political settlement process during 
or after conflict. The political settlement process is generally understood as ‘the forging 
of a common understanding usually between political elites that their best interests or 
beliefs are served through acquiescence to a framework for administering political power’ 
(Di John and Putzel 2009: 4). The workshop also examined how political settlements 
emerge and which actors and processes shape these settlements, and explored the 
relationship between peace agreements and constitutions during the broader political 
settlement process. In addressing these questions, workshop participants were asked to: 
define political settlements, assess the role of elite bargains (and who is included and 
excluded), evaluate the types of guarantees that should ensure implementation of the 
agreements, consider the most effective timing and sequencing of events to reconfigure 
the political settlement, and identify which factors are crucial to peace sustainability. 
In practice, peace agreements and constitutions are connected, although not in 
a linear or symmetrical way. Often the purpose of a peace agreement and/or (new) 
constitutional arrangement is to reach a new political settlement and document the 
commitments to it. Peace agreements often come before constitutions in the overall 
political settlement process, and sometimes constrain or determine the options for 
constitutional design; the constitution then becomes an additional instrument that 
enables sustainable peace. Given the link between these two documents, they often 
merge in the broader political settlement process into ‘constitutional peace agreements’ 
or ‘peace agreement constitutions’. Yet the commitment to a revised political settlement 
may be very thin or non-existent, in which case both the peace agreement and any 
7follow-up constitutional framework bear the heavy burden of trying to forge a new 
settlement capable of delivering peace. However, the academic and policy literatures 
on conflict resolution and constitution-building often address peace agreements and 
constitution-building as separate issues and processes. 
The methodological approach adopted for this workshop was a qualitative comparative 
framework using relevant case studies. The case studies helped participants assess and 
contextualize the impact of the political settlement process on the inclusiveness of the 
final constitution-building process, and potential lessons learned. The participants in 
the workshop are listed in Annex 1. The discussions were held under the Chatham 
House Rule.1 
The workshop comprised five sessions in which participants addressed a set of questions 
concerning the political settlements in the five case study countries—Libya, Somalia, 
Yemen, Zimbabwe and Kenya. The participants also drew on their knowledge of other 
cases, including South Africa and Northern Ireland. 
The first session established the conceptual framework defining political settlements and 
addressed the emerging practice and theory of political settlements and the relationship 
between peace agreements and constitutions within the broader political settlement 
process. It also reflected on the dynamics of bargaining and the role of inclusion 
throughout the process. It used the case studies of Kenya and Zimbabwe to examine the 
dynamics of constitutional negotiations, and the concepts of inclusion, participation 
and representation as they relate to the political settlement process. 
The second session addressed the issue of inclusion in the political settlement process 
in the context of Somalia, Libya and Yemen. It also explored the implications for 
inclusiveness and the differences between peace agreements that include constitutional 
provisions, and constitutions that serve as peace agreements, in terms of their production 
and relative inclusiveness. 
The third session addressed the issue of elite bargains and pacts—from the initial 
peace agreement to the constitution-making process—and the extent to which they 
may limit public participation, especially in constitution-building processes. It also 
addressed whether elites truly represent their constituents or include their inputs in the 
constitutional process. This session assessed the case studies of Somalia and Zimbabwe.
The fourth session turned to public participation to understand how inclusion can affect 
the constitution-making process and political settlement. It examined guarantees for 
implementation that elites might put in place while designing transitional arrangements 
(that is, the ‘peace agreement’ constitution or ‘constitutional’ peace agreement), and the 
extent to which these guarantees can hamper flexibility in the constitutional negotiation 
process. The case studies considered were Somalia and Kenya. 
The fifth session addressed the role of the international community, in its various guises, 
in the political settlement process and how that role can affect inclusion throughout the 
1 ‘When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the 
information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, 
may be revealed’. For further information, see <https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/chatham-house-
rule#sthash.7L9RA5h8.dpuf>
8process. The concluding session reflected on the previous discussions and identified 
lessons learned and consensus from across the case study countries. 
This report summarizes the workshop discussions, highlighting the normative and 
practical questions raised and the concluding thoughts of the participants. It serves as 
a starting point for a set of policy recommendations that may be further developed in 
a separate Policy Paper.
92. Definition
A commonly used definition of a political settlement is from Jonathan Di John and 
James Putzel: ‘the forging of a common understanding usually between political elites 
that their best interests or beliefs are served through acquiescence to a framework for 
administering political power’ (2009: 4). This definition accepts that such settlements 
are ‘usually forged between elites’ (Whaites 2008: 4; Di John and Putzel 2009; DFID 
2010: 22), but that participation and inclusion in political settlements are important for 
their success (Fritz and Menocal 2007; Castillejo 2014; see also Laws 2012). A political 
settlement is furthermore understood as both an objective and a process. As a process, 
it might be equated to both the peace and constitution-building processes, as a new 
political settlement is necessary when negotiated either a peace agreement or a (new) 
constitutional arrangement. 
The concept of a political settlement has developed in response to a sense of 
disillusionment across academia and in practice, with the study of transitions 
from conflict and authoritarian rule to peace and democracy. There is an emerging 
consensus that there has been a failure to understand the complexity of the politics of 
peacebuilding, regarding both the formal and informal processes through which elites 
negotiate and come to agreements. International actors often misunderstand the forces 
and mechanisms driving the decisions of local actors, and vice versa. More attention 
is needed in order to understand how the same tensions that fuel the conflict are often 
built into the peace agreement framework and play out in the constitution-building 
process.
The constitution is meant to solidify the political settlement in its most principled form. 
In stable states, constitutions reflect political consensus and are closely related to the 
underlying political settlement, which they document and translate into the country’s 
political and legal institutions. Yet in unstable settings, constitutions must often play a 
more developmental role in terms of building consensus, as a form of conflict-resolution 
mechanism. However, it is not clear whether constitutions can bear the burden of 
creating such a consensus, or whether they can survive with only a thin consensus as a 
minimum common denominator. In particular, where power-sharing arrangements—
political, territorial or military—are included, the political tensions of the conflict will 
often be built into the fabric of the constitution in ways that external experts are often 
not aware of. Constitutions are always reflective of political deals, but can ideally also 
transform local realities. This report will consider how these documents are constructed 
throughout the political settlement process, addressing both principled and pragmatic 
questions in the attempt to end conflict. 
The constitution-building process itself reflects a key tension present throughout the 
broader political settlement process: do post-conflict constitutions simply reflect the 
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elite power map, ossifying the relative strengths of each party to the political deal? 
Or can they transform a divided society in conflict into a united political community 
at peace? This question also affects how constitutions are viewed, in particular by the 
international community. Are they the starting point for a broad transformation of 
the political–societal order that, through the design of its political institutions and 
mechanisms, is capable of effecting real changes in attitudes and behaviours? Or are they 
better seen as the outcome of an underlying wave of political processes and dynamics, 
which results in a new grundnorm (basic law) upon which the constitution can be built? 
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3. Themes
Three key themes emerged from the five sessions: timing, participation and the role 
of the international community. While these themes overlap, each will be considered 
separately in this report, which references the case studies where relevant. 
Timing and sequencing in the political settlement 
process
A key issue that emerged in the discussion was the question of timing, which included 
questions of imposed deadlines throughout the political settlement process and the 
sequencing of specific events in the political settlement process—for example, a peace 
agreement followed by an interim constitution and then a final constitution. 
Regarding deadlines, the discussions highlighted a common challenge in the post-
conflict contexts studied as to whether to capitalize on the momentum for change 
and draft a constitution quickly (while fragile political consensus and alliances hold), 
or whether to proceed more incrementally to build a broad, stable and inclusive 
consensus upon which an enduring constitutional order can be built. This debate 
was left unresolved; most participants acknowledged the positives and negatives on 
both sides. As was argued with the case of South Africa, the required balance between 
speedy progress and incremental consensus- and trust-building was found in the phased 
process of negotiations necessary to draft the constitution, which was embodied in the 
roundtable CODESA agreements and the 34 constitutional principles included in the 
interim constitution, which guided the final constitution-making process. 
The question of timing also captures the complicated relationship between the peace 
and the constitution-making processes. This issue is explored in the case studies of 
Yemen (see Box 1), Somalia (see Box 2) and Libya (see Box 3). Conflict is dynamic and 
changing, and if not addressed at once it can mutate, as was the case in Yemen and 
Libya. In those cases, the constitution-building process was tailored to accommodate 
the interests and parties to the initial societal conflict. However, as that conflict mutated 
on the ground, the design of the constitution-building process became less capable of 
addressing the needs and demands of the conflicting parties. 
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Box 1: Yemen case study
The Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the Transition Process in 
Yemen (or Yemen’s interim constitution) was signed on 21 November 2011, and was 
followed by the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This agreement, backed 
by the UN and Gulf Cooperation Council, ended the conflict that had broken out in 
January 2011 following protests as part of the region-wide Arab Spring movement. The 
second phase of the agreement included the establishment of the National Dialogue 
Conference (NDC), which included 565 participants, equally divided between the 
South and North, which took nine months to report (three months longer than the 
original deadline), and issued 1,800 recommendations. While the NDC was more 
representative than most other political bodies in Yemen, it was also perceived by 
large parts of the population as an elite-driven process that did not address the issues 
important to ordinary people. 
The NDC was unable to reach consensus on all issues. The government pre-empted 
the constitution-making procedure with the establishment of a Regions Committee, 
which decided to establish a federal system with six regions, to which for instance the 
Houthis—a group of Zaidi Shia rebels from the north—and the Southerners would, 
for different reasons, not agree. 
In March 2014, the government established a 17-member Constitution Drafting 
Committee (CDC). During the drafting process, and especially right after the draft was 
finished, the conflict between the Houthi and the government in Sana’a significantly 
worsened: the Houthi staged a coup on 6 February 2015. It is disputed whether this 
conflict was a consequence of pre-constitutional problems, notably the federal division 
of the country, or a result of policy decisions made by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour 
Hadi’s government, which replaced the Saleh government in February 2012.
As a consequence of the renewed conflict, the CDC became more than a technical 
committee. While the CDC was not mandated to resolve the conflict, and did not 
directly address the concerns of the parties to the conflict, everything it did was 
reported to the actors in the conflict. However, both the constitution-drafting and 
peace processes, while happening simultaneously, were artificially preserved as separate. 
Workshop participants suggested that the NDC should have been transformed into a 
parliament to shorten the overall timeline, and that the NDC and CDC could have 
been compressed into a single process. However, overall the case study highlights the 
difficulties that arise when the constitution-making process is overtaken by a new and 
different conflict that challenges the political settlement and generates a new alternative 
political bargaining process.
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Box 2: Somalia case study
After a decade of conflict, the Djibouti-backed Somali National Peace Conference, 
which met from 2 May to 26 August 2000, represented an important breakthrough in 
peacebuilding in Somalia. The conference adopted the Transitional National Charter, 
which established a Transitional National Government and a Transitional National 
Parliament. 
In 2002, Kenya hosted the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference. The 
participating parties signed the Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and the 
Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process (Eldoret 
Declaration) in October 2002. In August 2004, a Transitional Federal Parliament 
was inaugurated, replacing the Transitional National Parliament. This new parliament 
adopted the Transitional Federal Charter as an interim constitution, which was 
replaced by a second Provisional Constitution (PC), passed by the National Constituent 
Assembly in July 2012. The 2012 constitution required political compromise with the 
Islamic groups that controlled cities, schools, social welfare and medical centres. The 
result was a constitution with contradictory principles between Islamic and liberal 
provisions, especially regarding human rights.
Furthermore, the 2012 constitution established that the Federal Republic of Somalia 
would be composed of two levels of government, the federal government level and the 
federal member states level, which comprises both regional and local governments. 
While these member states have to be newly established, the constitution does not 
specify their boundaries or their powers, which would need to be negotiated between 
the federal and member-state governments, and approved by the federal parliament; 
the member states have not yet been formally established. 
There is an ongoing process to draft a final constitution, but it is behind the schedule 
outlined in the PC, which mandates that a public referendum should be held before 
the end of the Federal Parliament’s first term in 2016. Unrealistic deadlines have been 
supported throughout the process by UN Security Council resolutions. The PC, 
however, is becoming increasingly compromised as there is a parallel political process—
aimed at negotiating regional boundaries—that is not following the constitutional 
process. Hence in practice, an agreement on regional boundaries will have to be signed 
before the final constitution can be drafted and adopted. 
This example shows that sometimes the use of constitutional iteration is the only option 
to slowly build a political settlement in a conflict-affected setting. At the same time, it 
also exemplifies the difficulty of engaging in such a process in this type of setting, and 
the additional complexity of having to fashion political settlements at the regional level 
before any countrywide political settlement can be agreed.
In Somalia, the constitution-building process has occurred alongside an ongoing 
conflict. Unlike many political settlement processes, in which the conflict ends before 
the constitution-building process begins, and given that the party to the conflict (Al-
Shabaab) is not party to the constitutional negotiations, this has had a notable influence 
on the design of the constitution. Specifically, the constitution has a significant Islamic 
character, which according to one workshop participant was intended to bring as many 
constituents inside the ‘constitutional tent’ as possible. Had the conflict been resolved 
before the constitution-building process, the constitution may have looked somewhat 
different. For further information on Somalia, see Box 6. 
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Box 3: Libya case study
The National Transitional Council (NTC) was formed as an interim rebel administration 
on 27 February 2011 in Benghazi as protests against President Gaddafi spread across 
the country. The NTC unilaterally issued a Draft Constitutional Charter for the 
Transitional Stage (‘Constitutional Declaration’), which called for the creation of an 
elected body, the General National Congress (GNC). The Constitutional Declaration 
was brief and did not include power arrangements. It was not drafted through an open 
process; in fact, it is unclear who drafted it. It was a political agreement, and was to an 
extent imposed by the international community, which needed a framework to work 
with. The NTC established the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) in June 2012 
to draft a new constitution.
In June 2014 elections were held for the House of Representatives (HoR) to replace 
the GNC. The election produced a legislature with a very different political makeup 
than the GNC. This sparked post-election violence in Tripoli that came under the 
control of rebel (Islamic) groups from the west, which supported the continuation of 
the GNC. The HoR fled to the eastern city of Tobruk, while the GNC continued to 
rule in Tripoli. The Supreme Constitutional Court ruled in November 2014 that the 
election of the HoR was unconstitutional and therefore the elections were invalidated. 
Both parliaments in Tripoli and Tobruk continued working, the latter disregarding the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling. 
The CDA is now functioning amid a civil war between the east and the west of the 
country. There has been a parallel ongoing attempt to reach another political agreement, 
brokered by the United Nations. And while attempts to broker a peace agreement 
have been unsuccessful, the CDA managed to release the latest constitutional draft 
in February 2016. There have also been calls to return to the pre-revolution 1951 
constitution, at least as a baseline for further negotiations. 
This example shows the difficulties of bringing about any kind of new and agreed 
political settlement in a context of general violence and distrust.
Workshop participants noted that in at least three cases (Yemen, Libya, Somalia) 
significant constitution drafting activity took place outside the country due to security 
concerns. This pattern suggests that the security situation should be a critical factor 
when deciding on sequencing—where basic peace is not guaranteed, no constitutional 
framework will ensure its own implementation. Ongoing conflict also has an obvious 
impact on the scale of participation that is possible, and general inclusion in the political 
settlement process. 
Participation and inclusion in the political settlement 
process
The second theme that was revisited throughout the course of the workshop was 
public participation and representation, which drew together questions on the merits 
and harm of inclusive processes in relation to the elite-led bargain on which the peace 
process rests. 
15
During the course of the workshop there was a recurring discussion concerning the 
definition of ‘the public’ when speaking about inclusion in the political settlement process. 
As a corollary to this discussion, there was some debate about the representativeness of 
those, such as civil society organizations, that claim to act on behalf of the public. Within 
this discussion a number of points were raised. One such point was that assuming 
there is the capacity for public participation in the process often presumes there is a 
functioning state and community, which is not always the case. Where there is ongoing 
conflict, such as in the cases discussed above, security concerns have implications for 
participation. Furthermore, ‘the public’ is often referred to as a single unit, whereas in 
communally plural and fragmented settings compounded by conflict, it is often very 
difficult to conceive of the public as a unified whole. 
There is also often an assumption that civil society, as a representative of the public, 
is necessarily good—and that the political class does not truly represent the people. 
Workshop participants agreed that these assumptions should be questioned. While 
those involved should not be overly idealistic about civil society, such organizations 
often deliver public goods or defend the rights of the population, and thus may be 
perceived as more legitimate than formally elected politicians, who do not necessarily 
hold legitimacy with the people. 
Throughout these debates, questions were raised concerning how beneficial public 
participation is to the outcome of negotiations in a political settlement process. 
Participants argued that an inclusive process will likely produce a more ambiguous 
document as a consequence of a public bargaining process than one that is drafted 
behind closed doors, where clearer ‘yes and no’ bargaining can take place. There was also 
discussion of the idea that public participation should be only be supported at certain 
stages of the process. Jon Elster’s metaphor of the hourglass was used to make the case 
that the public should be involved at the beginning, but that the discussion needed 
to be narrowed down to a smaller group of representatives to negotiate a deal before 
the people could be brought back into process. The constitution-building processes 
in Zimbabwe (see Box 4) and Kenya (see Box 5) both included public participation 
campaigns that are considered successful. 
This discussion of the legitimacy of civil society tied into another debate on inclusion 
as participation and representation. This also tied back to questions on timing and 
when it is best to introduce participation throughout the process, and the implications 
of different forms of inclusion on the perceived legitimacy and success of the final 
constitution. For example, the referendum is considered a popular mechanism to 
increase the inclusion and legitimacy of the constitution-building process. But while 
in Kenya the process would not have been considered legitimate without a referendum, 
South Africa and Tunisia are celebrated as participatory, inclusive processes that came 
to an end without one. 
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Box 4: Zimbabwe case study
Robert Mugabe has been president of Zimbabwe since its independence in 1980, and 
the Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) was the ruling 
party in parliament until the March 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections. 
In these elections, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)—both 
factions, the MDC-T and MDC-M—for the first time gained a majority in the House 
of Representatives, while the ruling ZANU-PF maintained control of the upper house. 
The presidential election was disputed, requiring a second run-off election between 
President Robert Mugabe and opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) to be 
held in June 2008. Tsvangirai withdrew from the process, citing violence and fraud. 
The African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
facilitated an agreement between ZANU-PF, MDC-M and MDC-T. ZANU-PF held 
control over the government, which strengthened their bargaining position, while the 
MDC-T had command of the electorate and legitimacy in the eyes of the international 
community. A power-sharing agreement, the Global Political Agreement (GPA), was 
signed by all parties plus SADC, underwritten by the AU and given constitutional 
effect by parliament (all parties called a whip vote). 
The main weakness of the agreement was that it was an elite pact; the smaller political 
parties were excluded from the negotiations. The GPA named the president (Mugabe) 
and prime minister (Tsvangirai). However, while it looked like a negotiation of equals, 
it was not: ZANU-PF stayed in a position of power. The power-sharing arrangement 
did not extend to the bureaucracy, which stayed under the control of ZANU-PF. The 
reasons for the limitation to the GPA included the MDC’s lack of experience; the 
SADC pressured the MDC to sign to bring peace before anything else. The MDC 
also questioned the neutrality of the SADC representative in the negotiations, South 
African President Thabo Mbeki. 
The GPA set out the terms of the constitution-making process, which included 
provisions for the process to be inclusive and democratic, and listed that public 
hearings and consultations must be held and overseen by the Select Committee of 
Parliament made up of the political parties. The committee was co-chaired by the 
three main parties represented in the power-sharing arrangement. The constitution-
making process included three phases: preparatory, outreach and drafting. Civil 
society, political parties and the international community were involved in the first 
phase. The second phase also included civil society alongside the political parties and 
external experts. Due to their involvement in the first two phases, civil society wanted 
to be involved in the drafting and negotiation phase. However, drafting was limited to 
the political parties. 
The first draft of the constitution was released on 17 July 2012. This was followed 
by an All-Stakeholders Conference in October 2012 to review the draft and make 
recommendations. ZANU-PF rejected several provisions of the draft, and submitted a 
list of 30 recommendations, which included restoring powers to the executive that had 
been reduced in the draft. Many of these recommendations were incorporated into the 
final draft constitution of 31 January 2013. This was accepted by referendum on 13 
March 2013, with 95 per cent in favour, and promulgated on 22 May 2013.
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Box 5: Kenya case study
In 1964 the government amended the 1963 post-colonial constitution to constrict the 
democratic basis of the state. In 1992, there was a return to plural democracy, but 
change did not go much beyond having a plurality of political parties. 
The system became more open in 1997, when the government passed the Constitution 
of Kenya Review Act to allow for constitutional review after the elections. This act 
was amended in 1998 to make participation a key aspect of the process, in response to 
informal national conferences that advocated for a more inclusive process. Yash Ghai, 
the chair of the newly established Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, led a 
process that sought to create dialogue among and between the government, political 
elites and the general public. A draft constitution was published in September 2002, 
but the president called for elections.
The opposition parties formed a coalition party for the December 2002 election, which 
allowed them to oust the incumbent independence party. However, the coalition 
immediately fell apart. This affected the constitution-making process, which ended 
with a failed referendum in November 2005. 
Following post-election violence in 2007, the African Union brokered a power-sharing 
agreement to establish a Government of National Unity. A new constitution was 
drafted as part of the agreement. A committee of experts was established as a technical 
mechanism to oversee the constitutional process. It was made up of eight members, 
four from each side, who were outside the political class because politicians were treated 
with suspicion. This constitution was passed in a referendum in 2010. 
The push for constitutional reform came from the people, who demanded an inclusive 
process in protest against their exclusion. Although the process that resulted in the 2010 
constitution was tied to the post-election violence settlement, the push for constitutional 
change began in the late 1990s, following the return to multiparty democracy in 
1992. While constitutional reform could have been handled by parliament, direct 
participation in the process was needed and demanded. Public participation helped 
determine the content, and has continued throughout the implementation stage.
Workshop participants also examined whether an inclusive process necessarily makes 
the final outcome—the constitution—more successful or legitimate. For example, 
there was concern about what happens to a commitment to public participation when 
the public wants to include something that contradicts international norms or liberal 
standards, as was the case in South Africa, where the majority wanted to include 
the death penalty in the constitution. The workshop participants’ response to this 
reservation was that the legitimacy of the constitution does not come from the number 
of people involved but from the overall process, as well as the wider relationship of the 
constitution to international legal standards. 
In many cases, the constitution is often agreed after a peace agreement and towards 
the end of the political settlement process, when many of the power dynamics and 
structures are determined. In the initial stages of the political settlement process, 
power and influence are determined by the relative military strength of the parties 
involved. Thus there is little space for women, non-armed groups and moderates to be 
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included in the process, at least at the peacemaking stage. Afterwards the space opens 
up somewhat, but even if the constitution-building process is a participatory process, 
discussions on process and design are already circumscribed by previous bargaining at 
the peace table. Additional issues raised were whether the same individuals or groups at 
the peace table should be included in the constitution-building phase of the settlement, 
and whether increasing the number of participants in the constitution-building process 
can destabilize earlier ‘elite pacts’. These questions were raised in the context of Somalia, 
where ongoing conflict with Al-Shabaab threatens to derail the political settlement 
process (see Box 6). 
Box 6: Somalia case study (continued)
A further complication to the constitution-making process in Somalia, which has been 
ongoing since 2004, is the conflict with Al-Shabaab. Even as the constitution drafting 
is drawing to an end, the Somali Parliament and Government have little control of the 
country beyond a small area in Mogadishu. Since 2011, the Somali Government has 
offered overtures to Al-Shabaab, though it refuses to lay down its arms.
The civil war started because the clans, in the absence of good government and 
protection, became dominant and took up arms. To bring trust and cohesion to Somalia, 
efforts need to be made to bring peace to the communities. However, insufficient 
attention has been paid to negotiating peace among the communities, in part because 
much of the money and resources provided by the international community have been 
directed towards the war on terror, given Al-Shabaab’s links to al-Qaeda, rather than 
peacebuilding.
This lack of peace has also affected public participation and therefore the legitimacy of 
the constitutional process. The Federal Constitution Commission spent its first years 
focusing on capacity building. However by 2010, public outreach for the constitutional 
process was not organized due to the poor security situation in Somalia, and related 
logistical and technical problems. The lack of public participation throughout the 
process increased the perception that the constitution was being produced outside 
the country. In order to correct this perception, outreach was conducted as much as 
possible given the security situation. Somalia is an oral society, so public radio was used 
extensively as well as television in urban areas. 
The 825-member National Constituent Assembly, which included 30 per cent women, 
passed the 2012 Provisional Constitution with 96 per cent in favour. The security 
situation made it virtually impossible to hold a referendum.
The international community’s role in the political 
settlement
The final theme that emerged in the workshop was the role of the international 
community in the political settlement process. While participants disagreed whether 
the ‘international community’ consists of the United Nations, a larger body of (donor) 
states, (international) civil society, or the international experts that give advice and/or 
technical assistance in these processes, they agreed that it holds a normative position, 
with the capacity to play either a negative or positive role. While the international 
community can provide the space to bring people together, it often is unaccountable for 
its own failures on the ground. Even as it pushes international norms on accountability 
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and transparency as the key to transitions, the international community is itself not 
accountable or transparent. Furthermore, the personnel who represent the international 
community in local processes are constantly changing, meaning that there is no real 
sensitivity to the day-to-day dynamics of the process. 
The UN, which is often at the forefront of international engagement in post-conflict 
processes, often holds the difficult role of organizing the international community in 
large-scale conflicts, requiring it to coordinate many different agendas and stakeholders. 
However, this is an almost impossible compromise to manage. The UN is often 
blamed for any failure or return to conflict, but the workshop participants noted that 
stakeholders must also accept some responsibility.
In political settlements, the international community and experts need to engage more 
with local politics and people. While participants acknowledged that this is difficult 
advice for the international community to follow, as there are no clear guidelines for 
increasing local engagement. International organizations may also lack the capacity 
for meaningful local engagement. The international community may also push 
constitution-making because it is expected as part of the formal political settlement 
process. This may motivate local actors to pursue constitutional processes in order to 
access aid controlled by the international community.
While the international community claims that it does not engage in cookie-cutter 
approaches to constitution-building, it often lacks the capacity (or sometimes even the 
willingness) to be more serious about understanding contextual specificities. At the 
same time, local players have a duty to assert themselves and to voice their agendas to 
their international counterparts. 
The workshop participants identified four elements that are crucial to the success or 
failure of international engagement in the mediation of political settlements, including 
constitutional negotiations:
1. Leadership. The need for leadership is essential. In rare instances, international 
actors will be forced to provide leadership, but in most cases their role should 
be focused on stressing the importance to national leaders of reaching sufficient 
consensus. 
2. Pragmatism. Principles such as early calls for elections or demands for 
constitutional referendums may be unhelpful in some contexts. More pragmatic 
solutions, such as executive power sharing, are sometimes the best way out of a 
crisis. 
3. Engagement. Some participants asserted that international mediators should 
engage with all parties to a conflict. If nothing else, doing so provides insight 
into the complete spectrum of views. Some actors, particularly those heading 
non-state armed groups, may be very isolated, and sometimes foreigners are 
the only ones who can give an independent reading on (or even an impartial 
perspective of) the status quo, and thereby help them in their decision-making. 
4. Patience. The international donor community is impatient for results, and its 
mechanisms—from short-term funding cycles to regular turnover of personnel—
work against the long-term, gradual nature of political settlements.
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4. Conclusion and recommendations
This workshop brought together academics and practitioners to consider the political 
settlement process in order to provide insights into the challenges discussed above. 
The workshop discussions and recommendations summarized in this report will form 
the basis of a Policy Paper that will include guidance and recommendations on the 
negotiation of peace agreements and constitutions as interconnected parts of political 
settlements and address the timing, sequencing, inclusion and role of the international 
community in the political settlement process. The paper will build on the preliminary 
recommendations below, which summarize the general output of the discussions and 
do not imply consensus on these issues.
1. A political settlement process is necessary to end conflict, and can create space for 
political discussions. The political settlement process creates political space that is 
necessary for transition. The international community may be able to provide this 
space to help actors bargain and find compromise. However, the international 
community has largely failed to understand the complexity of formal and 
informal political processes at the local level. The language and concept of the 
political settlement was developed to address this shortcoming, and has gone 
some way towards articulating this failure. 
2. There needs to be a balance between allowing time to build consensus and using 
deadlines to keep the process on track. If conflict is not adequately addressed through 
the peacemaking or constitution-building process during the same time period, 
the conflict can shift or re-emerge. The worst-case scenario is one in which the 
constitution-building process is trying to respond to out-of-date circumstances. 
Flexibility might be needed to place the constitution-building process on hold 
until a modicum of peace has been reached. At the same time, while a consensus 
has been emerging that timelines can be a useful tool, they only work where 
stability can be maintained and the circumstances do not radically change. In 
Kenya timelines worked, but in Somalia and Libya they did not.
3. Popular buy-in is important for future implementation. The constitution includes 
mechanisms for holding political elites accountable, which strengthens the case 
to include the public in the process. In the absence of enlightened elites, the role 
of the broader public is paramount in making sure institutions and processes are 
established that will hold elites accountable, and in continued enforcement of 
those accountability mechanisms. However, there is debate over when the public 
should be brought into the process. 
4. There is tension in the political settlement process between balancing broad 
participation and closed elite bargaining. While public involvement is important 
to help the people feel that the constitution addresses their concerns, broad 
participation can also destabilize political compromises. 
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5. Local and international actors need to work together and increase their mutual 
understanding. International actors often do not pay sufficient attention to local 
dynamics, yet it is increasingly clear that contextual issues can have a significant 
impact on the implementation of programmes or specific activities. 
6. The nature of conflict is changing. In many of the case studies considered in this 
workshop, violence (or the threat of violence) was present and/or changing 
throughout the constitution-making process. In some places, terrorist 
organizations were or started operating, making it more difficult to find a 
peaceful political settlement. There was tentative agreement among workshop 
participants that the process should engage with all actors, and that talking to 
such organizations does not equate to giving into their demands. 
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Annex 1. Workshop agenda
DAY ONE: 3 December 2015
Time Location Session
11:00 – 12:00 Carstares Room, 
Old College
Registration and brunch buffet
12:00 – 12:30 Raeburn Room, 
Old College
Welcome
12:30 – 14:00 Raeburn Room, 
Old College
Session I: Introduction to the conceptual 
framework of ‘political settlements’
This foundational session will establish the 
conceptual framework defining political 
settlements, drawing from on-going PSRP 
work and the gap this workshop seeks to fill. 
Furthermore, this session will interrogate the 
dynamics in constitutional negotiations, and 
the concepts of inclusion, participation and 
representation, as they relate to the ‘political 
settlement’ process.
Moderator: Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher
Leading questions:
• Christine Bell, on ‘What does the concept 
“political settlement” mean: multitude of 
events or a multidimensional process? Elite 
bargains or elite–constituency relations?’ 
• Tom Ginsburg, on ‘Overview of forces, 
mechanisms and actors in post-conflict 
constitution negotiations’ 
• Christie Warren, on ‘What forms of 
public participation/representation exist 
throughout the process and how do these 
differ?’ 
14:00 – 14:15 Break
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14:15 – 15:45 Raeburn Room, 
Old College
Session II: ‘Constitutional’ peace 
agreement vs. ‘peace agreement’ 
constitutions: implications for 
inclusiveness
This session will capture the differences between 
peace agreements that include constitutional 
provisions, and constitutions that serve as peace 
agreements, in terms of their production and 
relative inclusiveness. 
Moderator: Christine Bell
Leading questions:
• How do ‘constitutional’ peace agreements 
differ from ‘peace agreement’ constitutions 
and other constitutions? Do they differ in 
terms of inclusion of elites or the broader 
society? Do they imply different forms of 
trade-offs between elite power brokering 
and inclusion?
• When and how are constitutions (or 
constitutional provisions) produced 
within peace agreements, or after 
peace agreements, that is, as interim or 
permanent constitutions? What difference 
does it make to (a) the stability of the elite 
deal; (b) the broader inclusiveness of the 
process?
• To what extent does having one or the 
other have an impact on drafting the 
permanent constitution?
Experts on call:
• Abdurahman Hosh Jibril (Somalia)
• Mohammed Elghanan (Libya)
• Paul Williams (Yemen)
17:00 – 19:30 Lower Ground 
Floor, David 
Hume Tower
Reception and film screening
Screening of the film Democrats, a documentary 
on the Zimbabwe constitution-building process 
leading to the 2013 constitution, including a 
Q/A with the director and protagonists.
19:30 onwards Conference dinner
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DAY TWO: 4 December 2015
09.00 – 11:00 Centre on 
Constitutional 
Change Seminar 
Room, St John’s 
Land
Session III: Elite pacts and participatory 
constitution-making I: guarantees for 
the elite pact
This session will explore the importance 
of having elite bargains, and the extent to 
which they may limit public participation, 
especially regarding constitution-building 
processes. It will also deal with the 
relationship between elites and their 
constituents, in terms of representing them or 
including their inputs in the constitutional 
process. 
Moderator: Asanga Welikala
Leading questions:
• How do ‘peace agreement’ constitutions 
or ‘constitutional’ peace agreements put 
in place guarantees for the elite deal to 
be implemented during the political 
settlement process, or for the elite deal 
to remain in the final constitution? (for 
example, principles or other procedural 
mechanisms such as vetoes)
• How does constitutional design aim to 
accommodate and reflect underlying 
processes or bargains? 
• How do constitutions guarantee the 
elite pact beyond promulgation (for 
example, binomial electoral system in 
Chile, immunity from prosecution, 
eternity clauses)?
Experts on call:
• Shirwa Jama (Somalia)
• Hassen Ebrahim (Various)
• Douglas Mwonzora (Zimbabwe) 
11:00 – 11:15 Break
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11:15 – 13:00 Centre on 
Constitutional 
Centre on 
Constitutional 
Change Seminar 
Room, St John’s 
Land 
Session IV: Elite pacts and participatory 
constitution-making II: the effect of 
broad participation on the elite pact, 
and constraints on public participation 
via the elite pact
This session will examine guarantees for 
implementation that elites might put in place 
while designing transitional arrangements 
(that is, the ´peace agreement´  constitution 
or the ´constitutional´ peace agreement), 
and the extent to which these guarantees 
might hamper flexibility in the constitutional 
negotiation process. 
Moderator: Andy Carl 
Leading questions:
• To what extent does there need to be a 
‘bargain’ between elites in place in order 
for a constitution-making process to be 
successful?
• To what extent do elite bargains limit 
or enable other forms of participation: 
how open is that bargain to other 
normative claims from, for example, 
women or minority groups?  How does 
the process of peace and constitution-
building, insofar as it relates to 
public participation, make it easier, 
or more difficult, for elites to reach a 
compromise?
• What is the degree of authority and 
representativeness of elites at the 
negotiating table, and how does 
this affect their ability to commit 
constituents throughout the process?
• How does one account for spoilers 
who cannot be brought inside the 
constitutional project?
Experts on call:
• Jan Schmidt (Somalia)
• Hassen Ebrahim (Various)
• Douglas Mwonzora (Zimbabwe) 
• Martha Karua (Kenya)
13:00 – 13:45 Buffet lunch
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13:45 – 15:15 Centre on 
Constitutional 
Change Seminar 
Room, St John’s 
Land
Session V: What role for the 
international community throughout 
the political settlement process
This session will discuss the role of the 
international community, in its various 
guises, and how that role can affect inclusion 
throughout the political settlement process.
Moderator: Jason Gluck
Leading questions:
• Who is the international community? 
What are the diverse roles and interests?  
At what point in the process does it have 
a clear role to play? 
• What role does the international 
community play in forging the ground 
for elite cooperation?  What is its 
role in selecting/recognizing elites as 
negotiating parties in countries without 
formal governance structures?
• What types of strategies have proven 
effective in opening up the political 
settlement process to a range of other 
actors, and have these efforts stabilized 
or de-stabilized political settlements in 
the long term?
Experts on call:
• Jan Schmidt (Somalia)
• Benedetta Oddo (Libya)
• Mohammed Elghanan (Libya)
• Erik Solheim (Various)
15:15 – 15:30 Break
15:30 – 17:00 Centre on 
Constitutional 
Change Seminar 
Room, St John’s 
Land
Session VI: Conclusion and next steps
The final session will focus on what policy 
recommendations might emerge from the 
discussions.
Moderator: Sumit Bisarya
Panellists: Christine Bell, Tom 
Ginsburg, Christie Warren
30
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1. Rachel Anderson, DFID Peace Agreement Research Analyst, Edinburgh Law 
School
2. Christine Bell, Professor of Constitutional Law, Edinburgh Law School
3. Sumit Bisarya, Head of Mission and Senior Programme Manager, Constitution-
Building Programme, International IDEA
4. Markus Böckenförde, Executive Director and Senior Researcher, Centre for 
Global Cooperation Research, Duisburg University
5. Peter Bowling, GreenNet
6. Andy Carl, Executive Director, Conciliation Resources
7. Cindy Daase, Associated Fellow, Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz
8. Hassen Ebrahim, Member, Mediation Support Standby Team, Mediation 
Support Unit, UN Department of Political Affairs
9. Mohammed Elghanam, Seconded Appellate Judge from the Egyptian judiciary 
to the UN and Constitutional Advisor, United Nations Support Mission in 
Libya (UNSMIL)
10. Rob Forster, PSRP Research Analyst, Edinburgh Law School
11. Tom Ginsburg, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, Chicago University
12. Jason Gluck, Senior Program Officer, Constitution Making and Inclusive 
Politics, United States Institute of Peace
13. Shirwa Jama, Legal and Governance Advisor, IDLO, Somalia
14. Astrid Jamar, DFID Research Assistant, Edinburgh Law School
15. Abdurahman Hosh Jibril, Lawyer and former Minister of Constitutional Affairs 
and Reconciliation, Somalia
16. Dimitrios Kagiaros, Teaching Fellow, Public Law and Human Rights Law, 
Edinburgh Law School
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for Gichugu Constituency and an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya
18. Douglas Mwonzora, Zimbabwe Secretary General, Movement for Democratic 
Change 
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20. Benedetta Oddo, Partnership Building Senior Advisor, Euro-Mediterranean 
Region, Parmenides Foundation
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21. Jan Pospisil, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Political Settlement Research 
Programme, Global Justice Academy
22. Jenna Sapiano, PhD candidate, School of International Relations, University of 
St Andrews
23. Jan Schmidt, Research Fellow and Somalia Country Manager, Max Planck 
Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law
24. Rebecca Smyth, Student, Edinburgh Napier University
25. Erik Solheim, Chair, OECD Development Assistance Committee 
26. Silvia Suteu, Doctoral Candidate, University of Edinburgh and Associate 
Director for Research Engagement, Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law
27. Stephen Tierney, Professor of Constitutional Theory and Director, Edinburgh 
Centre for Constitutional Law
28. Chris Thornton, Project Manager for Middle East and North Africa Regional 
Office, Humanitarian Dialogue Centre
29. Christie Warren, Professor of the Practice of International and Comparative 
Law and Director, Comparative Legal Studies and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 
Program, William and Mary Law School
30. Asanga Welikala, ESRC Teaching Fellow in Public Law, University of Edinburgh 
School of Law, and Associate Director, Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law
31. Paul Williams, President, Public International Law and Policy Group
32. Laura Wise, Research Analyst, Edinburgh Law School
33. Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher, Senior Programme Officer in Conflict, Security and 
Constitution Building, International IDEA
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About International IDEA
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International 
IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democracy 
worldwide. International IDEA’s mission is to support sustainable democratic change 
by providing comparative knowledge, assisting in democratic reform, and influencing 
policies and politics.
What does International IDEA do?
In the fields of elections, constitution-building, political parties, gender in democracy 
and women’s political empowerment, democracy self-assessments, and democracy and 
development, we undertake our work in three activity areas:
1. providing comparative knowledge derived from practical experience on 
democracy building processes from diverse contexts around the world;
2. assisting political actors in reforming democratic institutions and processes, and 
engaging in political processes when invited to do so; and
3. influencing democracy building policies through the provision of our comparative 
knowledge resources and assistance to political actors.
Where does International IDEA work?
International IDEA works worldwide. Based in Stockholm, it has offices in Africa, the 
Asia-Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean. International IDEA is a Permanent 
Observer to the United Nations.
<http://www.idea.int>
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SE -103 34 Stockholm
Sweden
Phone + 46 8 698 37 00
Fax + 46 8 20 24 22
Email: info@idea.int
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